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Cannino: Implementing a Long Term Work Visa Program to Document the Undocu

IMPLEMENTING A LONG TERM WORK VISA
PROGRAM TO DOCUMENT THE
UNDOCUMENTED AND PROTECT THE U.S.
WORKFORCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Our country's economy relies on foreign labor. 1 This need has
continually influenced immigration policies alongside the goals of
national security, maintaining sovereignty, and protecting American
workers.2 These policies are commonly born out of public sentiment.
The United States has a long history, contrary to popular belief, of being
unwelcoming to new immigrants, especially in times of economic
downturn.3 In these times, society goes after immigrant, undocumented
individuals first (i.e. we need jobs, why are foreign-born persons
employed).4 However, our dependence on foreign labor keeps a steady
stream of undocumented persons coming to the United States each year,
ready and willing to work.5
In an effort to reduce and ultimately stop illegal immigration,
Congress passed the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986
1. See Richard A. Johnson, Note, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent Need for an
Updated Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the United
States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 254 (2007) [hereinafter Twenty Years of the IRCA]; see also
Shannon Leigh Vivian, Note, Be Our Guest: A Review of the Legal and Regulatory History of U.S.
Immigration Policy Toward Mexico and Recommendations for Combating the Employer
Exploitation of Nonimmigrant and Undocumented Workers, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.189, 191
(2005).
2. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 306 (5th ed. 2009). "[N]ational security is ... one of the many policy ingredients

in the mix." Id at 816. Protecting American workers can be seen in the labor certification
provisions. See id. at 307.
3.
HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED: AMBIVALENT
LAWS, FURTIVE LIVES 2-3 (2001).

4. See Legal Workforce Act: Hearing on H.R. 2164 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112 ,h Cong. 85 (2011) (statement of
Tyler Moran, Policy Director, National Immigration Law Center) [hereinafter Hearing on HR.
2164, statement of Tyler Moran], http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/ 12th/I 1244_66887.PDF.

5.

See Twenty Years ofthe IRCA, supranote 1, at 252.
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(IRCA) which contains increasingly restrictive policies that criminalized
the employment relationship between undocumented persons and
employers.6 Although this avenue of immigration control has proven to
be ineffective, there is still a major push in Congress to attack the same
problem in the same way with the Legal Workforce Act (H.R. 2885).7
The Legal Workforce Act proposes to maintain the enforcement
structure of IRCA and replace the current employment verification
requirement with an electronic verification system.
This note proposes an alternative approach to deal with the
presence and influx of undocumented workers that balances the need for
foreign labor and the need for immigration control. Part II provides an
overview of IRCA and its specific provisions designed to deal with the
issues of illegal immigration and how it has influenced and changed the
situation for undocumented immigrants in our country. Next, Part III
outlines the current use of the electronic employment eligibility
verification system, known as E-Verify, and its existing problems. Part
IV discusses the projected effects of the mandatory use of E-Verify as
proposed by the Legal Workforce Act. Lastly, Part V offer
recommendations, specifically an alternative approach, proposing a new
nonimmigrant visa.9
The proposed visa is a long-term visa that would allow visa holders
to work. It includes a protection provision for American workers in the
form of specified application dates ensuring that visa holders apply after
U.S. workers have already had the opportunity. In addition, persons
applying for the proposed visa cannot be inadmissible.1 0 While the
proposed visa does not create a separate path to legal permanent
residence or citizenship, there is no penalty or additional process for visa
holders to change their status." Implementation of the visa would start
6. See id. at 244-45.
7. Legal Workforce Act of 2011, H.R. 2885, 112'h Cong. (2011).
8. See infra Part IV.A
9. A visa is permission from the U.S. government to enter the United States. Bureau of
Consular
Affairs,
U.S.
Dep't
of
State,
Wat
is
a
US.
Visa?,
(last visited Feb. 25, 2013).
http://travel.state.gov/visa/questions/what/what 4429.html
Nonimmigrant visas are issued to aliens who do not intend to immigrate and are in the United States
temporarily for a limited purpose. See Vivian, supra note 1, at 191 n. 11. There are currently over
forty nonimmigrant visa categories. Immigration and Nationality Act § 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)-(V) (2006).
10. Inadmissibility refers to provisions established within the INA to prohibit certain
individuals from entering the United States. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (2006). Examples of individuals who are excludable are those that may become a public
charge, individuals with health problems, criminals, and terrorists, to name a few. See id
11. See infra Part V.A.I.
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with persons already in the United States with no threat of immigrationbased reprisals. 12 Having status" provided by this new proposed visa
will give foreign workers a legal recourse for labor violations.
International law and human rights law have set standards regarding
both the treatment of aliens and workers' rights. According to the U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the United States has
ratified, these rights apply to all people, indiscriminate of documentation
or lawful presence.14 Similarly, our own Bill of Rights and other
amendments, such as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, apply to all people within the United States, again indiscriminate
of lawful presence.' 5 Currently, under IRCA, there is a lack of
protection given to undocumented workers faced with abusive
employment situations, in violation of these international normS.16 The
goal of this new visa category is to create a way for the economy to have
the foreign labor it requires while protecting the rights of all workers
within the United States.
II. IMMIGRATION REFORM & CONTROL ACT OF

1986

A. History of the IRCA

1. Undocumented Workers in America
Undocumented workers have a particular role in the economy, such
as providing inexpensive work in jobs not wanted by others." "It is
unquestionably the case that economic forces bring majority of migrants
to the United States .... [They] come to this country for economic
12. See infra Part V.A.1-2.
13. Status refers to an individual's legal right to be within the United States: citizens, legal
permanent residents, nonimmigrant visa holders. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 204, 8
U.S.C. § 1154 (2006).
14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N.) applies to all people. AVIVA CHOMSKY,
"THEY TAKE OUR JOBS!" AND 20 OTHER MYTHS ABouT IMMIGRATION xviii (2007).
15. Our Bill of Rights, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all people living in
the United States. Id. at xix.
16. See Lucas Guttentag, Immigration-Related Employment Discrimination: IRCA's
Prohibitions,Procedures,and Remedies, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 29, 31 (1990) ("Unauthorized aliens
fall outside the coverage of this provision and cannot invoke its protections.").
17. David W. Haines, Labor at Risk: The Exploitation and Protection of Undocumented
Workers, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 346, 351 (David W.

Haines & Karen E. Rosenblum eds., 1999). As can be seen by what is going on in both Alabama
and Georgia, U.S. citizens are either unable or unwilling to do the work formerly performed by
undocumented workers. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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opportunity far superior to those available to them in their homeland."' 8
Temporary workers are ideal for agricultural industries and
undocumented workers are ideal for industries needing day laborers
because they are "disposable and self-disposing." 9 This preference for
undocumented workers is recognized within the agriculture industry
itself and it "historically has been afforded special consideration in the
area of immigration policy . . . .",o As early as 1917, the agriculture
industry began asking the federal government to make exceptions to its
immigration laws. 2 1 Even today, owners in the agriculture industry
claim that they would go out of business if it were not for the cheap
labor provided by undocumented workers.22 These workers make up
five percent of the U.S. labor force 23 and are an "integral part" of the
American economy.24
Our need for foreign labor has continually been dealt with by
Congress through various immigration legislation including international
agreements, guest worker visa programs, and even by lack of specific
legislation, such as leaving out employers from the INA provision
regarding harboring undocumented persons through the Texas Proviso.25
Most notably linked to our current illegal immigration problems is the
treaty between the U.S. and Mexico, in which Mexico agreed to supply
U.S. agriculture with much needed labor, commonly known as the
bracero program. 26
18.
KEvIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICAN NEEDS TO RETHINK
ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 119 (2007) [hereinafter OPENING THE FLOODGATES].

Although undocumented immigrants receive wages beyond what could have been earned in their
home country, they are still considered low by U.S. standards. Id.
19. See Haines, supranote 17, at 354.
20. Patrick C. McManaman, Comment, From Bracero to H-2A San Joaquin Valley
Sheepherders:Lessons Learnedfrom the Failureof Our Nation's Guest Worker Programs, 16 San
Joaquin Agric. L. Rev. 127, 131 (2007).
21. See Philip L. Martin, Unauthorized Workers in US. Agriculture: Old Versus New
Migrations,in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION INAMERICA: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 133, 146-147 (David
W. Haines & Karen E. Rosenblum eds., 1999).
22. See Haines, supranote 17, at 351.
23. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supranote 2, at 1143-44.
24. Vivian, supra note 1, at 191; see also Twenty Years ofthe IRCA, supra note 1, at 254.
25. See Vivian, supra note 1, at 191-92; Darcy M. Pottle, Note, FederalEmployer Sanctions
as Immigration Federalism,16 Mich. J. Race & L. 99, 106 (2010).
26. The bracero program is thought to be the root of contemporary illegal immigration.
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, at 1141. In addition, the bracero program is seen as
contributing to the immigration problem in two ways, by setting in motion the flow of migration
from Mexico and continuing even after the labor flow was no longer authorized. HAYES,, supra note
3, at 30. What began as illegal migration eventually became illegal immigration; "the easy access to
former braceros meant that growers substituted illegal labor for the formerly legal bracero labor."
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, at 1142.
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The bracero program imported several million temporary Mexican
farmworkers and operated from 1942-1947 and again from 1951-1964.27
"On paper the braceros had considerable rights. ... [However][,] [t]he
[Department of Labor's] enforcement of the contract guarantees for
wages, housing, and suitable food and water was virtually
nonexistent." 28 "[T]here was little that braceros could do about their
treatment[;] ... if they complained they would lose their jobs, be
deported, and be black listed from future bracero employment., 29
Essentially, "workers were subject to the absolute power of their
employers."3 o The Mexican government had reservations about the
program because of the discrimination that occurred and even barred
certain states from participating. 31
This disapproval along with
increased public awareness of the exploitation of Mexican workers by
participating employers led to the termination of program in 1964.32
However, even after the agreement was terminated, many former
braceros remained in the United States to work, despite the deplorable
working conditions.
2. The Push for Interior Enforcement Coupled with Border Enforcement
Prior to the passage of IRCA, the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (INA) attempted to stop illegal immigration and reduce the presence
of undocumented persons through border enforcement; focusing on
admission, entry, harboring and transportation of illegal aliens. 34 The
INA was notably silent regarding employment of undocumented
workers. 35 The McCarran -Walter Act of 1952 made it illegal to "harbor,
transport, or conceal illegal entrants." 36 However, a proviso, lobbied for

27. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supranote 2, at 1141; HAYES, supranote 3, at 29.
28. McManaman, supra note 20, at 132.
29. Marjorie S. Zatz, Using and Abusing Mexican Farmworkers: The BraceroProgram and
the INS, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 851, 855-56 (1993). "One Bracero described the experience:
'[T]hey treated us like animals .... But as a Bracero, you knew you couldn't complain."'
McManaman, supra note 20, at 133.
30. Laura C. Oliveira, Comment, A License to Exploit: The Need to Reform the H-2A
Temporary Agricultural Guest Worker Program, S SCHOLAR 153, 158 (2002).
31. See Vivian, supranote 1, at 198.
32. See id.; McManaman, supranote 20, at 133.
33. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supranote 2, at 1141-42.
34. Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Note, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving Undocumented Workers
Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws?, HARV. LATINO L. REv. 119, 120 (2003); see also
Twenty Years oflRCA, supranote 1, at 247.
35. Calderon-Barrera, supra note 34, at 120.
36. Pottle, supra note 25, at 106.
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by the agricultural industry entitled the Texas Proviso, explicitly
excluded employment from the "harboring" category.
This was
interpreted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the
agency charged with enforcing the Act, as free rein to employ
undocumented workers.38
Following the bracero program and the continued influx of
undocumented persons into the United States, Congress had to determine
the best way to achieve the goals of immigration policy: national
security, maintaining sovereignty and protecting American workers.3 9
They decided that to best accomplish this would be to change the focus
of their immigration policies from border enforcement, which had
proven to be ineffective, to interior enforcement.40 Congress felt that
"[s]anctions, coupled with improved border enforcement, [was] the only
effective way to reduce illegal entry . . . ."41 The solution came in the

form of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).
Although its roots are in immigration law and reform, its branches have
far reaches into the employment and labor sphere through its mandated
procedures and employer sanctions. IRCA was passed on the premise
that if employment opportunities for unauthorized workers were gone,
the "magnet" bringing undocumented persons into the country would be
weakened. 4 2 "[T]he Committee [was] convinced that as long as job
opportunities [were] available to undocumented aliens, the intense
pressure to surreptitiously enter the [United States] or to violate status
once admitted ... in order to obtain employment [would] continue. 43 By
weakening the magnet, Congress hoped that illegal immigration would
go down overall."
Proposals advocating employer sanctions to relieve the problem
were being talked about and proposed since 1972.45 Prior to the passage
of IRCA, Congress had concluded that unauthorized workers were a

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See H.R.Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46-47 (1986). "[T]he adverse impact of illegal aliens
Id. at
was substantial, and warranted legislation both to protect U.S. labor and the economy.
52.
40. See Twenty Years of the IRCA, supra note 1, at 247-48; see also Naomi Barrowclough,
Note, E-Verify: Long Awaited 'Magic Bullet' or Weak Attempt to Substitute Technology for
ComprehensiveReform?, 62 RUTGERS L. REv. 791, 796 (2010).
41. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 49.
42. Twenty Years of the IRCA, supranote 1, at 248.
43. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt 1., at 56.
44. Twenty Years of the IRCA, supranote 1, at 248.
45. Calderon-Barrera, supranote 34, at 121.
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major contribution to the 1970s economic "tailspin."4 6 Studies at the
time just prior to IRCA's passage highlighted that undocumented
workers took American jobs, depressed wages and impaired working
conditions.47 Congress intended to place the burden on employers
regarding the employment of unauthorized workers.4 8 The idea was to
remove illegal competition and the incentive for employers to employee
these workers.49 It is clear from the legislative history of IRCA that
Congress did not intend for unauthorized workers to be unprotected.50
The House Judiciary Committee recognized that in order to assure wages
and employment conditions of lawful residents, undocumented workers
needed to be protected by labor law." Further, Congress realized that in
order for IRCA to be effective, undocumented workers had to remain
protected by U.S. employment and labor law to prevent unscrupulous
employers from gaining a competitive advantage by ignoring IRCA's
prohibitions and hiring undocumented workers. 5 2
B. Main Provisions of the ImmigrationReform and ControlAct 5 3
The Immigration Reform and Control Act is laid out in section
274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and deals with the
"Unlawful Employment of Aliens." 54 As mentioned above, this section
of the INA asserts that it is unlawful to "hire, or to recruit or to refer for
a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is
an unauthorized alien ... with respect to such employment,"55 and
imposes sanctions on the employer for non-compliance, either monetary
fines, possible jail time, or both.56 This puts the onus of unauthorized

46. Twenty Years of the IRCA, supranote 1, at 245.
47. Calderon-Barrera, supranote 34, at 121.
48. Id.
49. Id
50. Twenty Years of the IRCA, supra note 1, at 249. "It is not the intention of the Committee
that the employer sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any way labor
protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of federal or state labor relations boards, labor
standards agencies, or labor arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocumented
employees for exercising their rights before such agencies or for engaging in activities protected by
existing law." H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt.1, at 58.
51. Calderon-Barrera, supra note 34, at 122.
52. Twenty Years of the IRCA, supra note 1, at 250.
53. The provisions presented and discussed here represent only a quick introduction to the
legislation.
54. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).
55. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(1)(A).
56. 8 U.S.C. §1324a(e)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1).
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work on the employer rather than the undocumented aliens7 by making
employers responsible to verify the employee's right to work in the
United States.ss In addition, IRCA gave amnesty to undocumented
immigrants who resided in the United States continuously prior to
1982.59 The third major provision was the increase in the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) budget to allow for both increased
border patrol and enforcement of the sanctions imposed by the Act.6 o
Just as with the bracero program and the legislation before it,
agriculture had a hand in certain provisions of IRCA.6 ' The concessions
lobbied for by the agricultural industry appear in the "Special
Agricultural Workers" (SAW) and "Replacement Agricultural Workers"
(RAW) provisions.62 Under SAW, farmworkers could be legalized under
relatively liberal provisions, as opposed to the general amnesty provided
for by the act.
Once legalized, SAW workers did not stay in the
agricultural industry. 4 Instead, because of increased opportunities, they
moved into other industries. 65 Because Congress and the agriculture
industry foresaw that both the amnesty provided in IRCA and the SAW
provision would move workers out of agriculture, they included the
66
RAW provision. Under RAW, if a labor shortage were ever to develop,
replacement workers could be "imported" for the agricultural industry
only. 6 7 However, once gone from agriculture, legalized workers were
often replaced by undocumented workers.68
Section 274A further lays out what is appropriate documentation to
confirm an individual's right to work in the United States.69 This
verification is currently done through the 1-9 process. 70 There are
twenty-seven documents, some taken in combination with one another,
which prove work authorization.7 Due to the fact that so many
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Calderon-Barrera,supra note 34, at 120.
See id
Twenty Years of the IRCA, supra note 1, at 244-45.
Id. at 245.
See Zatz, supra note 29, at 861.
See id at 860-861
See id at 861.
Martin, supra note 21, at 149
See Haines, supra note 17, at 357.
See Martin, supranote 21, at 149.
See Zatz, supra note 29, at 861.
Martin, supranote 21, at 149.
See Immigration and Nationality Act §274A, 8 U.S.C.
See Pottle, supranote 25, at 114.

§§

1324a(b)(1)(B)-(D) (2006).

See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-924T, EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION:
71.
CHALLENGES EXIST IN IMPLEMENTING A MANDATORY ELECTRONIC VERIFICATION System 4-5
available
at
VERIFICATION
CHALLENGES],
(2007)
[hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT
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documents are available to prove authorization, there is an ever-growing
business in fraudulent documents.72 In addition, employers in general
receive incomplete guidance regarding document screening73 and the
magnitude of fraudulent documents makes it difficult for employers to
comply with the law.74 For these reasons, employers are "bound to
make wrong enforcement decisions, either in good faith or with
discriminatory intent to try to minimize legal liability."75
This section of the INA also provides for an affirmative defense for
employers in the good faith provision. Section 274A(a)(3) reads:
A person or entity that establishes that it has complied in good faith
with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section with respect to the
hiring, recruiting, or referral for employment of an alien in the United
States has established an affirmative defense that the person or entity has
not violated paragraph (1)(A) with respect to such hiring, recruiting, or
referral.76
This good faith defense relates to the standard accepted for
"knowingly." According to case law, "knowingly" means willful
blindness.77 This standard is better for employers because it is more
difficult to prove. Alternatively, the regulations state that "knowingly"
equates to reason to know, a standard very different than willful
blindness. Due to the fact that employer sanctions are so infrequently
enforced, employers are able to use the good faith defense in all
circumstances except for the most egregious.79
Lastly, section 274B was added to IRCA because of congressional
concern that imposing employer sanctions would result in

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07924t.pdf. "Eight of these documents establish both identity and
employment eligibility (e.g., U.S. passport or permanent resident card); 12 documents establish
identity only (e.g., driver's license); and 7 documents establish employment eligibility only (e.g.,
Social Security card)." Id at 5 n.7.
72. See Pottle, supra note 25, at 114.
73. See id at 115 ("Even the Handbookfor Employers, produced by USCIS, contains only a
few examples of valid documents, despite the existence of several valid circulating versions of each
of the twenty-seven acceptable forms of identification.").
74. See id
75. Id. at 116.
76. Immigration and Nationality Act §274A, 8 U.S.C. §1324a(a)(3) (2006).
77. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, at 1160. See, e.g., Zamora v. Elite Logistics,
Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1177 (10" Cir. 2007); New El Rey Sausage Co. v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153, 115758 (9h Cir.1991); Collins Food Int'l, Inc. v. INS., 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9"' Cir. 1991), Mester Mfg.
Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561, 567 (9" Cir. 1989), Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 999,
1003 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
78. See8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(l)(1) (2008).
79. See Pottle, supra note 25, at 107.
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discrimination.so Unlike the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII,
which only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, §274B
applies to employers with three or more employees and does not carry a
designated period of time that employees must be employed.8 ' This
extra provision added many covered employers and facilitated speedier
remedies.82 However, this section only applies to citizens, immigrants,
and non-immigrants authorized to work.83 Undocumented workers are
explicitly not offered protection under this provision. 84
IRCA was passed by Congress with the specific intent of curbing
illegal immigration into the United States.85 Although the specific
provisions of IRCA are meant to accomplish this goal by shifting the
focus of immigration control to the interior rather than only at the
borders, IRCA has had different effects than originally imagined.86
Illegal immigration has steadily increased since the passage of IRCA,
undocumented persons are still employed, and undocumented workers'
rights are being continually violated.87
C. The Effect of the ImmigrationReform and ControlAct on
UndocumentedIndividuals
IRCA has changed the situation for undocumented persons and
workers within the United States. Employer sanctions made the plight
of undocumented immigrants more desperate and surreptitious.
Unauthorized workers have been forced underground, afraid of
immigration consequences so they deal with whatever work conditions
are forced upon them regardless of federal laws in place to protect
workers. 8 9 "[E]xploitation without legal recourse is a daily fact of life
for [undocumented persons]." 90 Even though courts have held that
undocumented workers are protected under U.S. labor law, such as the
NLRA, many do not come forward when their rights are violated for fear

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Guttentag, supra note 16, at 29.
See id.
Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2006).
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(C) (2006).

85.

See Twenty Years of the IRCA, supra note 1, at 244.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 247.
Id. at 251.
HAYES,supra note 3, at 121.
See id.; see also OPENING THE FLOODGATES, supranote 18, at 120.
HAYES, supranote 3, at 120.
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of immigration reprisals. 91
1. Rights of Undocumented Workers under U.S. Law
Prior to the passage of IRCA, the United States Supreme Court
decided Sure Tan, Inc. v. NLRB. 92 After a union-organizing drive, the
union won its election. 9 3 However, the employer, Sure-Tan Inc.
believed that six of the seven votes for the union were made by
undocumented workers and objected to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), the agency charged with enforcing the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).94 The employer's objection was overruled.9 5
The employer then wrote the INS and reported these six employees.96
Five of them were found to be unlawfully present in the United States
and self-deported themselves. 9 7 The NLRB ordered Sure-Tan to pay
backpay to these individuals for committing an unfair labor practice in
violation of the NLRA §§8(a)(1) and (3).98 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that Sure-Tan violated the Act
but modified the Board's remedial order.99 Sure-Tan applied for writ of
certiorari.' 0 0
The Supreme Court held that undocumented workers are
"employees" under the NLRA, which "provides that the term
'employee' shall include 'any employee,' subject only to certain
specifically enumerated exceptions," of which undocumented workers
are not.' 0 ' The Court felt that this interpretation is consistent with the

91. See generally Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that the employer
committed an unfair labor practice by reporting their employees that were known to be
undocumented workers, but the employees had already left the county due to fear of deportation);
see also Calderon-Barrera, supranote 34, at 121-122.
92. 467 U.S. 883.
93. Id. at 886.
94. Id. at 887.

95.

Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 889. Section 8(a)(1) reads, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7]."
National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). Section 7 asserts that employees
have the right to organize, collectively bargain and engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or refrain from the above. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 8(a)(3) makes
it an unfair labor practice for the employer to discriminate in a way that tends to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
99. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 889.
100. See id. at 890.
101. Id. at 891. NLRA §2(3) which reads that the term "employee" shall not include
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Act's purpose to encourage and protect collective bargaining.' 0 2 I
addition, the Court recognized that the application of the NLRA to
undocumented workers helps to assure that wages and employment
conditions of citizens and lawful permanent residents are not undercut
by cheaper labor afforded by undocumented workers. 0 3 Two years
following the decision of Sure-Tan, Inc., the IRCA was passed.104
Although it criminalized the relationship between employers and
undocumented employees, it remained silent on whether these sanctions
changed undocumented workers' status under U.S. labor law.'0 5
Although the intent of Congress to afford undocumented workers
equal protection under labor law (and the law in general) is clear, postIRCA court decisions have limited undocumented workers'
protections.106 The leading case is Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB. 0 7 In Hoffman, the Supreme Court interpreted the IRCA as a
barrier regarding undocumented workers' access to the legal remedy of
backpay.' 08 Employer, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, fired four union
organizers.1 09 After such action, the NLRB found an unfair labor
practice and awarded reinstatement and backpay to the four
employees."o One of the employees, Jose Castro, testified before the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) during the hearing for backpay that he
was a Mexican national and not authorized to work in the United
States."' Further, he explained that he got his job by presenting a
friend's birth certificate.1 2 Based on this fact, "the ALJ found [that] the
Board [was] precluded from awarding Castro backpay.. . .
However,
the Board reversed the decision of the ALJ holding "the most effective
way to accommodate and further the immigration policies embodied in
[IRCA] is to provide the protections and remedies of the [NLRA] to

agricultural laborers, domestic servants, any individual employed by a parent or spouse,
independent contractors, supervisors or any individual employed by an employer subject to the
Railway Labor Act. 29 U.S.C. §152(3).
102. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
103. See id. at 893.
104. See H.R. REP No.99-682, pt. 1, at I (1986).
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f) (2006).
106. See Twenty Years ofthe IRCA, supra note 1, at 251.
107. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
108. Id. at 149.
109. Id. at 140.
110. Id. at 140-41.
111. Id. at 141.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees." 1 4
The employer appealed the Board's finding. 15
The Supreme Court held that "allowing the Board to award back
pay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in
IRCA."ll 6 The Court decided that Sure-Tan did not control because
IRCA was passed after that decision which "makes it a crime for an
unauthorized alien to subvert the employer verification system by
tendering fraudulent documents."' 17 Alternatively, the Court found that
the Southern S.S. Co. line of cases controlled, which established "where
the Board's chosen remedy trenches upon a federal statute or policy
outside the Board's competence to administer, the Board's remedy may
be required to yield.""' The Court felt awarding back pay trivializes
immigration law and encourages future violations. 19
Unfortunately, employers are using Hoffman to deny undocumented
individuals rights under state laws as well. "Some states have relied on
the Supreme Court's reasoning to deny workers compensation and other
benefits to undocumented workers."1 20 Although the Hoffman court
only addressed the issue of undocumented workers who obtained their
positions by fraud and not undocumented workers who presented no
documentation (i.e. it was the employer who committed an IRCA
violation), as per Hoffman, the NLRB in memo 02-06 stated that
undocumented workers are per se not entitled to back pay.12' The
NLRB acknowledged that Hoffman did not specifically address this and
based the decision on the fact that the NLRA and IRCA cannot be
harmonized on this issue. 12 2
The NLRA is not the only labor and employment law in which the
rights afforded to undocumented workers is vague. "A significant
uncertainty exists about whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act offers
any protections whatsoever to undocumented immigrants." 2 3 Clearly
the current system monitoring the undocumented workforce is
ineffective at protecting their basic rights. While our economy is
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id at 142.
Id at 151.
Id at 148.
Id. at 147.
Id at 150.

120.

OPENING THE FLOODGATES, supra notel8, at 120.

121.
122.
123.

See Calderon-Barrera, supra note 34, at 136.
See id.
OPENING THE FLOODGATES, supra note 18, at 121.
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dependent upon foreign labor, our society cannot afford to have people
exist outside of the law. As stressed above, "undocumented workers
retain basic [human] rights that no one would contest." 24 Therefore, a
balance must be reached between our country's need for foreign labor
and the need to protect all persons within the United States. For this
balance to be reached, there must be accountability under the law.
2. Consequences of Minimal Protection to Undocumented Workers and
the Ineffectiveness of IRCA
Not protecting undocumented workers gives employers a greater
incentive to both employ and exploit them.12 5 As workplace
enforcement is no longer a priority, businesses write off any sanctions
imposed by the enforcement of IRCA as a necessary business
expense.12 6 Illegal immigration has steadily increased since the passage
of IRCA in 1986.127 As discussed above, undocumented persons
legalized under IRCA's amnesty moved into other industries because of
an increase in opportunities.128 Positions left open by legalized
undocumented workers were filled by new undocumented individuals.1 29
In addition, newly legalized undocumented persons became anchors
within United States for other undocumented individuals.130
IRCA has failed at its purported goals and has been widely
unsuccessful. The two major contributing factors of IRCA's lack of
success, as have been discussed, are the lack of enforcement of employer
sanctions and the fact that the overall benefit to employ undocumented
persons outweighs the risks. 13 ' In the twenty-five years since its
passage, "IRCA has caused our nation more harm than good." 32 "Flaws
in the structure of IRCA have resulted in fraud [and] bias. ... 133
Additionally, since 1986, the number of illegal immigrants has
continued to grow and the prior pattern of circular migration has stopped
and more people remain in the United States permanently.134
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Haines, supra note 17, at 346.
See OPENING THE FLOODGATES, supra note 18, at 120.
See Pottle, supra note 25, at 108-09.
Twenty Years of the IRCA, supra note 1, at 251-52.
Haines, supra note 17, at 357.
See id at 357-58.
Id at 357.
Twenty Years ofthe IRCA, supra note 1, at 253.
Id at 251 (quoting Judith P. Miller & David Tannenbaum).
Oliveira, supra note 30, at 164.
See Twenty Years of the IRCA, supra note 1, at 251-52.
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However, although the structure of IRCA has not elicited positive
results, Congress has attempted to save the legislation through the
introduction of the Employment Eligibility Verification Program. This
program works within the current structure of IRCA, replacing the
existing 1-9 process, in which employers manually inspect verification
documents, with an electronic database for employers to input
information gathered on the 1-9 form to immediately check the
employee's work eligibility.'
It is the hope that this new system will
make IRCA more effective and help to achieve its original goals.
III. AN ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION SYSTEM:

E-VERIFY
A. What is E-Verify?

E-Verify began as a one of "three voluntary pilot programs to test
electronic means for employers to verify an employee's eligibility to
work" as required by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA").' 36 Due to the fact that there
were twenty-six documents available to prove work eligibility, it was
easy for prospective employees to commit document fraud. 3 1 In
addition, employers are not document experts and E-Verify is an effort
"to remove guesswork from document review during the 1-9 process." 38
The Basic Pilot Program was designed to determine if the current
employment verification process could be improved in "reducing (1)
false claims of U.S. citizenship and document fraud, (2) discrimination
against employees, (3) violations of civil liberties and privacy, and (4)
the burden on employers to verify employees' work eligibility."' 3 9 The
pilot programs were originally available in only five states: California,
Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas.14 0 Out of the launched pilot

135. See infra Part III.A.
136. EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supra note 71, at 5; Lizzette Romero,
Note, E-Veri': Expansion and Recent Developments, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 605, 607
(2008).
137. See Shelly Chandra Patel, Note, E-Verify: An Exceptionalist System Embedded in the
Immigration Reform Battle Between Federaland State Governments, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
453, 458-59 (2010).
138. Carl Wohlleben, Note, E-Verify, A Piece of the Puzzle Not a Brick in the Wall: Why All
U.S. Employers Should Be Made to Use E-Verify, Just Not Yet, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 137, 156 (2009).
139. EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supra note 71, at 5.
140. Patel, supra note 137, at 459.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 12
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

562

[Vol. 30:547

programs, only the Basic Pilot Program now known as E-Verify
survived.141 It was renamed the Employment Eligibility Verification
Program in 2007 by the Bush administration.14 2 Along with the
"rebranding" in 2007 the Bush administration "pledged to expand both
civil and criminal investigations of employers who hire unauthorized

workers."l 4 3
E-Verify is a joint operation between the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)'" and the Social Security Administration (SSA).1 4 5 It
allows employers to check the work eligibility of their current and
potential employees through an Internet based database.146 By doing so,
it is hoped that fraudulent documents will be immediately detected and
those without work authorization will not become employed. It is meant
to confirm the legal status of employees and does this by comparing
information provided to employers by employees on an 1-9 form to both
the SSA database and the DHS database.147 To enroll in E-Verify
employers must visit the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS)1 48 E-Verify enrollment website, provide a series of
information about the company, elect a representative to electronically
sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), choose a program
administrator and lastly read and agree to the terms within the MOU.149
141. Michael B. Bamett, Note, The High Cost of Low-Cost Workers: Missouri Enacts New
Law Targeting Employers of Unauthorized Workers, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 801, 804, 804 n.23 (2009).
142. Patel, supra note 137, at 459.
143. Id. at 460.
144. The Department of Homeland Security was created in response to the September 1 1
attacks. See Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
It replaced the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), taking over the task of administration
and enforcement of the INA. See Who Joined DHS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
145. See Romero, supranote 136, at 606.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 607.
148. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) is a component of the newly
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and performs the administrative functions. See
Who Joined DHS, supra note 144. A few examples of the various responsibilities of USCIS are
issuing visas, changes of status, applying for citizenship, applying for legal permanent residency,
and petitioning a spouse or relative. What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dl a/?vgnextoid=
fb8952ob9f9a321OVgnVCMlOOOOOb92ca6OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=fb89520b9f9a32 1OVgnVCM
100000b92ca60aRCRD (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). Enforcement functions have been delegated
within DHS to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), who are tasked with immigration law
enforcement in the interior, and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), who are tasked with
immigration law enforcement at the borders. Who JoinedDHS, supranote 144.
149.

The

Enrollment

Process,

U.S.

CITIZENSHIP

&

IMMIGRATION

SERVS,

http://www.uscis.gov/everify (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). There are detailed instructions on the E-
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Critics note that "DHS does not screen those who enroll in the program
to verify that they are bona fide employers."150 Therefore, anyone can
sign up and have access to the information in the E-Verify system.' 5'
The employer must input the information from the 1-9 form into the EVerify system within three days of hire.152 After the employer inputs the
information, he or she receives either a confirmation that the employee is
eligible to work or a "tentative non-confirmation" (TNC). 3 An
employee who was given a TNC has the opportunity to contest the
finding, which must be filed within eight days and can take up to several
weeks for the employee to receive either a "final non-confirmation"
(FNC), meaning the individual is not authorized to work, or an
affirmative confirmation, verifying the employee is eligible.15 4 The
employer is required to allow the employee to continue working
throughout the TNC verification process. 1s Although employers are
required to allow employees to continue working, one study found that,
against the Memorandum of Understanding signed by employers when
enrolling in E-Verify, employers were restricting work assignments
while an employee was contesting the TNC.15 6
Many people who are authorized to work in the United States, both
citizens and legal permanent residents (LPRs) receive TNCs. 15' The
main reasons why persons authorized to work in the United States
receive TNCs are a change of citizenship status, a name change not
properly reported to the SSA or if the employer input information from
1-9 form incorrectly into the E-Verify system.158 "According to SSA
officials, although SSA instructs individuals to report any changes in
name, citizenship, or immigration status, many do not do so."l59 To
verify page, as well as checklists and such to make sure the employer is prepared prior to starting
the enrollment process. Id.
150. Tyler Moran, Why States and Localities Should Not Require Employer Participationin
Basic Pilot/E-Verify, NAT'L IMMIGR. L.CTR. (Oct. 21, 2006), http://www.nilc.orgeev005.html.
151.
152.

Romero, supra note 136, at 615.
EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supra note 71, at.5.

153.

Romero, supra note 136, at 609.

154. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-l1-146, EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION:
FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES
REMAIN 9 (2010) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS], available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/dl 1 146.pdf.
155.
See EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supra note 71, at 8.

156. See Wohlleben, supranote 138, at 151.
157.
See Laura Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of
McCullough, 33 BERKELEY J.EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 172 (2012).
158.

Romero, supra note 136, at 613; EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supra note

71, at 10.
159.

EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supranote 71, at 10.
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contest a TNC, the individual must go to an SSA field office, show
documentation of the change and have the information updated in the

SSA database.160
Employers are not required to fire an employee who receives a
TNC and decides not to contest it, or even an employee who receives an
FNC.16 1 After ten days, if the employee has not contested the finding
and the employer has decided to hire the individual, the employer must
inform the DHS that they have decided to continue to employ the
individual.162 These instances are referred to as "Employee Not
Terminated." 63 However, the employer is responsible if the retained
employee is in fact undocumented.'" This decision should not be taken
lightly and the employer should seek legal counsel when deciding
whether to keep an employee who has received a TNC and decided not
to contest it.' 65 To avoid incorrect, TNCs and FNCs, USCIS offers a
new feature in the form of a "self-check," which allows individuals to
check themselves prior to engaging in the hiring process.'16 If E-Verify
were made mandatory, it would be in the best interest of employees to
complete a "self-check" prior to applying for jobs to avoid lengthy
complications and taking time out of work to go to the SSA office to
correct information.
B. Current Use ofE- Verify
In 2009, upwards of 112,000 employers were registered for EVerify,'6 7 and an additional 4,000 employers signed up each month. 6 s
160. See id
161. See id. at 8. Though, once a case becomes an FNC, "[t]he E-Verify employer agent can
close the case in E-Verify and the employer can terminate employment without penalty." U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY: QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS 15

(2012),

available

at

http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-

Verify NativeDocuments/E-Verify/20Manuals%20and%2OGuides/guide-employer-comp.pdf
(emphasis added).
162.

EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supranote 71, at 8.

163.

See E-Verfy Releases Q&A Discussing TNCs and Employee Rights, THE E-VERIFY & 1-9

NEWS BLOG (Mar. 19, 2010), http://everifyandi9news.com/2010/03/e-verify-releases-qa-discussingtncs-and-employee-rights/.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See John Fay, USCIS Expands E- Verify Self-Check Coverage to 16 AdditionalStates and
Adds Spanish-Language Option, THE 1-9 AND E-VERIFY BLOG (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://www.electronici9.com/everify/uscis-expands-e-verify-self-check-coverage-to-16-additionalstates-and-adds-spanish-language-option/.
167. Wohlleben, supranote 138, at 149.
168. Barnett, supranote 141, at 807.
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However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 169 reported that
only half of the registered employers were "active users."o170 A
employer is considered "active" if it has run a minimum of one query
within the past fiscal year.' 7' While E-Verify is a voluntary program
offered by the federal government, there are some employers that are
required to enroll. In accordance with Executive Order 13,465 signed by
President Bush on June 6, 2008,172 federal agencies, federal contractors,
and federal subcontractors are required to use E-Verify.' 73 The
contractors and subcontractors are required to "verify the employment
eligibility of: (i) all persons hired during the contract term by the
contractor to perform employment duties within the United States; and
(ii) all persons assigned by the contractor to perform work within the
United States on the Federal contract."' 74 This means contractors must
verify both new hires and existing employees with the E-Verify
system."' To implement the Executive Order, a final rule was passed
amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) by "adding 'a
clause into Federal contracts committing Government contractors [and
subcontractors] to use . . . E-Verify' . . . .

The Executive Order and the Final Rule prompted a complaint by
the Chamber of Commerce, claiming that both were prohibited by the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA). ' Subsection (a) of IIRIRA states that that the Secretary of
Homeland Security cannot require any person or other entity to
participate in a pilot program, except as specifically provided in
subsection (e).7 8 The court found that neither the Executive Order nor
the Final Rule was prohibited by IIRIRA because neither made the
program mandatory.' 79 The court asserted that "the decision to be a
169. The Government Accountability Office is an investigative arm of Congress that ensures
federal funds given to agencies are being used effectively. See About GAO, U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.htmi (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
170.

EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supranote 71, at 3.

171. Id.at8n.10.
172. Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,285 (2008). This Executive Order amended
Executive Order 12,989 signed by President Bill Clinton on Feb. 13, 1996. See id.
173. See id at 33,286.
174. Id.
175. Patel, supra note 137, at 460.
176. Chamber of Commerce v. Napolitano, 648 F. Supp. 2d 726, 731 (D. Md. 2009)
(referring to the Final Employment Eligibility Verification Rule (Final Rule), 73 Fed. Reg. 67, 651
(Nov. 14, 2008)).
177. See id. at 732.
178. See id at 729 (citing IIRIRA § 402(a)).
179. See id at 733-36.
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government contractor is voluntary and that no one has a right to be a
government contractor" and went on to say that "potential government
contractors have the option not to contract with the government." 80
In addition, some states have put through legislation making it a
requirement for employers to use the E-Verify program. Currently four
states: Arizona, Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina have passed
legislation requiring all employers to use E-Verify rather than rely on the
documents available to prove eligibility.1"' In addition, multiple other
states have passed legislation requiring state contractors,1 82 state
agenciesl83 or both state agencies and contractorsl84 to use E-Verify.
These types of laws have sparked a debate over states' ability to regulate
immigration when it has been established over the years that the federal
government alone has sovereignty over immigration issues. 8 1
180. Id. at 736.
181. Map
of
States
with
Mandatory
E- Verify
Laws,
NUMBERSUSA,
http://www.numbersusa.com/content/leam/illegal-immigration/map-states-mandatory-e-verifylaws.html (last updated Oct. 20, 2011).
182. See id. (showing Colorado and Louisiana as states requiring the use of E-Verify for state
contractors).
183. See id (showing North Carolina as the only state requiring E-Verify for state agencies
but not for state contractors).
184. See id. (showing Idaho, Utah, Oklahoma, Georgia, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska,
Tennessee and Virginia as states which require the use of E-Verify for both state agencies and state
contractors).
185. See Wohlleben, supra note 138, at 143. States are enacting immigration laws "under the
guise of state police powers to protect the safety and welfare of their constituents." Patel, supra
note 137, at 468. The IRCA expressly preempts state and local law other than through licensing and
similar laws. Wohlleben, supra note 138, at 143. See discussions on specific cases and how the
lower courts have ruled in Wohlleben at 143-47, Patel, supra note 137, at 467-71, and Barnett,
supra note 141, at 812-18. In June 2012, the Supreme Court weighed in on these issues in Arizona
v. UnitedStates. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2011). Specifically, the Court looked at
four provisions of an Arizona statute known as S.B. 1070, which attempts to address the issues
faced by Arizona because of the large numbers of undocumented persons within the state. Id. The
Court held that federal law preempted three of the four provisions. Id at 2495. First, with regards
to section 3, which required persons to carry their alien registration document, the Court determined
that "with respect to the subject of alien registration, Congress intended to preclude States from
'complement[ing] the federal law, or enforc[ing] additional or auxiliary regulations."' Id. at 2503.
The Court next examined section 5, which made it a crime for an unauthorized alien to work, and
determined that the history of the IRCA showed that Congress chose not to impose sanctions on
unauthorized workers. Id at 2503-05. Therefore, "[i]t follows that a state law to the contrary is an
obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose." Id. at 2505. Lastly, the Court concluded that
section 6 is also preempted. Id. at 2507. Section 6 provides that a state officer may arrest, without a
warrant, an individual whom he or she has probable cause to believe has committed an offense that
makes that individual removable. Id. at 2505. The Court held that "authorizing state and local
officers to engage in these enforcement activities as a general matter ... creates an obstacle to the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id at 2507. With regards to the last provision looked at
by the Court, section 2(B), which requires officers to make an attempt to determine the immigration
status of anyone they stop, detain or arrest, the Court determined that "[a]t this stage, without the
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Aside from the above stated required users, more than 409,000
employers within the United States currently use the E-Verify program
and approximately 1,300 new businesses sign up to use E-Verify each
week.' 86 In 2007 the GAO was already skeptical about the many
challenges existing with widespread mandatory use of E-Verify.187
Similarly, in 2010 the GAO put out another much more comprehensive
report regarding the inefficiencies of E-Verify, which will be discussed
below when looking out the viability of passing the Legal Workforce
Act, making E-Verify mandatory for all employers countrywide.' 88
C. Existing Problems with E- Verify
Currently, the E-Verify program is riddled with problems, including
false positives (allowing unauthorized people to "pass"), false negatives
(restricting legal permanent residents or U.S. citizens from obtaining
gainful employment) and expensive start up costs. 89 The reported
inaccuracy rate is a striking fifty-four percent.190 The SSA has estimated
upon its own investigation that there were 17.8 million discrepancies in
its system, which is what is relied upon by the E-Verify system.191 False
positives occur because E-Verify is only able to detect fraudulent
documents.192 Therefore, if an undocumented employee submits valid
documentation that is just not his or her own, E-Verify will confirm that
individual is eligible to work because the true document holder is
eligible to work. False negatives occur because of the issues discussed
above; persons not reporting name changes, immigration status and
benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B)
will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law." Id. at 2510.
186.

What

is

E-Verify?,

U.S.

CITIZENSHIP

AND

IMMIGRATION

SERVS.,

http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dla/?vgnextoid=
e94888e60a4051 I0VgnVCM I000004718l9OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=e94888e60a405 11 OVgnVC
M 1000004718190aRCRD (last updated Nov. 1, 2012).
187. EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supra note 71, at 14.
188.

See generally EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 154.

189. See Romero, supra note 136, at 613-14; see also Philip E. Wolgin, The 10 Numbers You
Need to Know About E-Verify: What it Will Cost Employers, Employees and Taxpayers, CTR. FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(September
13,
2011),
http://www.americanprogress.orgissues/2011/09/everify numbers.htm (detailing the average
startup costs for running E-Verify in a small business).
190. Wolgin, supranote 189.
191. See Patel, supranote 137, at 463.
192. See Romero, supra note 136, at 613-14; EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES,
supra note 71, at 3 (noting that the Employment Eligibility Verification program helps reduce
document fraud, but cannot sufficiently address identity fraud issues such as when employees use
genuine documents that were either stolen or borrowed from other individuals).
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citizenship changes to the SSA.1 93
Additionally, E-Verify does not relieve employers' angst and fear
of liability surrounding the 1-9 process. 194 Employers enrolled in EVerify are unsure of their liability.' 95 For example, if they do not check
documents closely enough, they may be held responsible for knowingly
hiring an undocumented individual and if they look too closely they may
be held responsible for discrimination.' 96 Additionally, the inspector
general found that employers are pre-screening individuals before hiring
them and also verifying existing employees, both of which are
prohibited in the Memorandum of Understanding that employers must
agree to in order to enroll in E-Verify.197
Actions taken by employers because of their uncertain liability
leads to a major concern that widespread use of E-Verify could lead to
employers not hiring people who "look foreign" even though they are
authorized to work, such as U.S. Citizens and LPRs, because of the extra
processing time.' 98 Commentators explain that making the process
mandatory for all new hires would alleviate this concern, stating that this
burden is equal to all new hires, regardless of how job applicants look.' 99
This does not address the concern at all. The concern is that persons
who "look foreign" will not even make it past the interview. Therefore,
requiring a process for new hires (which means the person has
interviewed, had an offer and accepted this offer) does not alleviate any
concern that foreign looking persons will not be hired. In addition, EVerify is extremely vulnerable to identity fraud. 20 0 Barnett contends that

193.

See EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION CHALLENGES, supra note 71, at.3,10.

194. See id at 4 (describing the Form 1-9 requirements and noting that employers are
generally found to be in compliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) if they
have followed the process in good faith, including when fraudulent documents appeared to be
genuine); see also Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777,
806 (2008) (noting that employer's concerns include: (1) sanctions would impose onerous
administrative responsibilities on employers; (2) the possibility that employers could be held civilly
and criminally liable for innocent hiring decisions; and (3) sanctions would cut employers off from
requisite immigrant labor).
195. See Immigrating, E-Verify: "Safe Harbor"forEmployers?, IMMIGRATING TO AM. (July
29, 2008), http://immigrating.wordpress.com/2008/07/29/e-verify-for-employers-and-employees/
(noting that an employer who puts information into E-Verify that is false or creates a red flag is
supplying the information for their own liability since U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) has stated that there is no "safe harbor" for employers under this program).
196. Wohlleben, supranote 138, at 149.
197. Id. at 150.
198. See Barnett, supra note 141, at 806.
199. See id.
200. See Anthony Weigel, It's Not Time to Expand E-Verip, It's Time to Face Reality, Fox
NEWS (June 10, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/06/10/its-not-time-to-expand-e-
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the threat of identity fraud is being addressed in the photo screening tool,
which will include photos in fifteen million DHS files.2 01 However, this
will only address identity fraud in the instances when a picture is on file
with DHS.
Another major problem with E-Verify is the amount of tentative
non-confirmations (TNCs). LPRs and naturalized citizens are at least
ten times more likely to be wrongly identified as "unauthorized."202
LPRs and foreign born citizens are thirty times more likely to incorrectly
receive a TNC.203 The burden is then on the employee to contest the
incorrect information in order to keep his or her job.204 Not all
employees are properly informed regarding the process to contest
TNCs.205 Many of these problems exist because DHS and SSA are not
communicating
or
sharing
information
forcing
secondary
2 06
verifications.
The SSA does not contain alien numbers and the DHS
does not contain the social security number (SSN) of individual workauthorized migrants.2 0 7

Although there are these wide-spread reported problems, a USCIS
report purports that improvements have been made.208 USCIS reported
in an article on their website on June 14, 2010 that they have redesigned
E-Verify for better use.209 Improvements include a new home page,
"case alerts" feature, improved case management, streamlined tutorials,
enhanced security features, such as hiding SSNs to protect individual's
privacy and verifying that only valid companies enroll in E-Verify. 210
In theory, E-Verify is the savior of IRCA. The major identified
problem with IRCA as it exists now is the ability to falsify documents
and obtain gainful employment because employers are not trained
verify-its-time-to-face-reality/.

201. See Barnett, supra note 141, at 807.
202. J. Kelly Conklin, Mandatory E-Verify: Bad for Small Businesses and the Country 's
Bottom
Line,
THE HILL'S CONG.
BLOG
(Sept.
16,
2011,
10:38
AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/labor/182003-mandatory-e-verify-bad-for-small-businessesand-the-countrys-bottom-line.
203. See Barrowelough, supranote 40, at 812.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See id
207. Id.
208. See USCIS Launches Redesigned E-Verify Employer Web Interface, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGR.
SERVS.
(June
14,
2010),
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/template.PRINT/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6
dla/?vgnextoid=875b328ad73921OVgnVCMOOOOO082ca6OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=8a2791daff
2dfl lOVgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD.
209. See id
210. Id
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immigration documentation specialists. If there was a way to guarantee
whether or not the documents were fraudulent, many of the problems
behind IRCA would be dissolved. Unfortunately, E-Verify has proven
to not be up for the job. There is no guarantee when running
information through E-Verify, which makes mandatory use dangerous
for the United States workforce. Further, it is unlikely that the flaws in
the E-Verify system can or will be resolved. 2 1 1 However, its mandatory
use is being proposed, by amending the INA with the Legal Workforce

Act. 212
IV. LEGAL WORKFORCE ACT
A. H.R. 2885, the Legal Workforce Act
The Legal Workforce Act is the name given to proposed bill H.R.
2885, which makes direct changes to INA §274A(b), deals directly with
how to verify that an employee is authorized to work.2 13 Instead of
requiring documentation from List A or one document each from List B
& C as laid out in the section, and familiar to those individuals who have
completed an 1-9 form, the new bill calls for employers to check
employee eligibility through the existing E-Verify system. 2 14 The most
important change made by the bill is that it makes E-Verify mandatory
for all employers, from one employee up. 215 The National Immigration
Law Center (NILC) describes the act as "an immigration enforcementonly bill that will increase the deficit, cause American workers to lose

211. Historically there have been continued problems with inter-agency cooperation. Civilian
agencies are reluctant to divert scarce resources from their core missions to interagency missions.
See NINA M. SERAFINO, CATHERINE DALE & PAT TOWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42133,
BUILDING CIVILIAN INTERAGENCY CAPACITY FOR MISSIONS ABROAD: KEY PROPOSALS AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42133.pdf
In
addition, "organizational differences - including differences in agencies' structures, planning
processes, and funding sources - can hinder interagency collaboration, potentially wasting scarce
funds and limiting the effectiveness of federal efforts." U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-09-904SP, INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION: KEY ISSUES FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES, ORGANIZATIONS, WORKFORCE, AND INFORMATION SHARING
(2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/203867.pdf. The problems with interagency collaboration
are not unique to the objectives described in these reports; these same problems are found in every
interagency effort. See id.
212. Emily Patten, Note, E-Verifv During a Period of Economic Recovery and High
Unemployment, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 475,482 (2012).
213. See Legal Workforce Act of 2011, H.R. 2885, 112th Cong. (2011).
214. See id
215. See id
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their jobs, decimate agriculture, and grow the underground economy."216
In addition to substantive changes, the bill also lays out a timeline
regarding compliance; within two years, all employers within the U.S
must be enrolled.217 Proper compliance would require some employers
to not only verify future workers, but current employees as well. There
is a special carve out for the agricultural industry, proposing a longer
compliance time (36 months) and not requiring verification of existing
employees.2 18 Lastly, similar to the IRCA, the Legal Workforce Act
contains a good faith clause, which sets the standard of employer
knowledge.2 19
The bill was first introduced in June 2011 as H.R. 2164 by Lamar
Smith of Texas and reintroduced in September of the same year as H.R.
2885.220
Currently, the bill has been ordered to be reported on
September 21, 2011 and was referred to the Subcommittee on
Immigration Policy and Enforcement on September 14, 2011.221 It has
seventy-eight supporters as of March 10, 2013.222 As discussed above,
in December of 2010, the Government Accountability Office still
identified significant challenges with the E-Verify system. 223 Although
both USCIS and SSA have attempted to increase the accuracy of EVerify and "reduce opportunities" for unauthorized workers, the
government's ability to accomplish these goals is limited.2 24 "Worksite
enforcement is an integral part of an effective employment authorization
system," but there are limited resources and ICE is unable to address all
but the most egregious employer violations. 225 The GAO reported that
the program still remains vulnerable to fraud, as some are using the
system to access personal information,226 and also has challenges in
detecting fraud, such as when an unauthorized individual provides

216. NAT'L
IMMIGRATION
L. CTR., LAMAR SMITH'S EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY
VERIFICATION SYSTEM: HARMFUL TO THE ECONOMY AND DANGEROUS FOR U.S. WORKERS 1 (Sept.
2011) [hereinafter LEGAL WORKFORCE ACT: HARMFUL AND DANGEROUS], available at
www.nilc.org/document.html?id=555.
217.
H.R. 2885, at 18-20.
218. Id. at 20-21, 25.
219. Id. at 35-36.
220. LEGAL WORKFORCE ACT: HARMFUL AND DANGEROUS, supra note 216, at 1.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi112th
Cong.
(2011),
221.
H.R.
2885
bin/bdquery/z?dl 12:HR02885:@@@L&summ2-n&#status (as reported on Sept. 14, 2011).
222. Id.
223. See EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 154, at 53-55; See
discussion supra Part Ill.C.
224. Id at 53.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 21.
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legitimate documents taken from an authorized person.22 They also
discovered limited ability to identify and prevent employer misuse and
difficulty in sanctioning non-compliant employers. 22 8 Additionally, both
USCIS and SSA have been unable to accurately estimate costs of
mandatory implementation of E-Verify, which creates problems as
budgets need to be made for effective implementation of programs. 2 29
Mandating a system with so many flaws remaining - 54% failure to
identify unauthorized workerS230 and 47% erroneous TNCs and FNCs of
authorized U.S. workerS231 - in addition to threats of increased fraud by
employers, fraud by potential employees and discrimination has evoked
strong emotions on the part of interested parties.
B. Public Responses to ProposingMandatoryNational Use ofE- Verify
Major players are stepping forward and opposing this bill. The
American Immigration Lawyers Association believes that the bill should
not move forward stating that "[i]f Congress passes this law, we will see
thousands of employed or job-seeking Americans wasting their time
standing lined up at government offices to clear up their records."232
Similarly, the Agriculture Coalition opposes the Act declaring that "[i]f
Congress makes mandatory use of the E-Verify program, crops will rot,
farms will fail, much U.S. farm production and many farm-dependent
U.S. jobs will simply leave the country." 233 Tyler Moran, Policy
Director for the NILC, also brings attention to the fact that a mandatory
E-Verify system would drive undocumented workers underground
(outside our tax system), move agriculture jobs overseas, force
American workers to wait on lines to correct information, and cause
234
many people to lose their job due to government error.
The NILC expresses several concerns with making E-Verify
227. Id. at 15.
228. See id. at 53.
229. See id at 43.
230. Leann Gerlach, Recent Development, Mandatory E-Verification in North Carolina: The
Adverse Consequences of the System in the Absence of Comprehensive Reform, 91 N.C. L. REv.
361,382 n.171 (2012).
231. IMMIGRATION POL'Y CTR., DECIPHERING THE NUMBERS ON E-VERIFY'S ACCURACY
(2009), http://www.irmmigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/deciphering-numbers-e-verifys-accuracy.
232. The Lamar Smith Bill to Mandate E-Verif Should Not Move Forward, AILA INFONET
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=36983, [hereinafter Lamar Smith
Bill].
233. Marcus Restrepo, Agriculture Coalition Opposes E-Verify, COLO. INDEP. (June 17, 2011,
2:07 PM), http://coloradoindependent.com/91444/agriculture-coalition-opposes-e-verify.
234. Id.
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mandatory for all employers, as the Legal Workforce Act proposes.
Specifically, the NRC states that the implementation timeline, as briefly
laid out above, is "impractical and unworkable." 2 35 It further explains
that it took ten years to enroll the 250,000 employers who currently
participate and there are 5.5 million employers that would need to be
enrolled.2 36 This would equate to enrolling approximately 219,492 each
month for two years.237 Additionally, the bill "fails to address the real
needs of the agricultural industry." 23 8 These concerns were expressed in
a statement made to the House Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement at a Hearing on
the Legal Workforce Act by Ms. Moran where she stressed to Congress
that the Legal Workforce Act was not the answer.239 Instead, Moran
argued that the United States needs to enforce labor, employment, and
civil rights laws or couple the use of E-Verify with a more
comprehensive immigration reform plan, such as a legalization
program.240
In addition, several prominent politically active groups in the U.S.
have written letters to Congress urging members not to endorse Smith's
bill. The Coalition Letter to Congress re: E-Verify states that the data
breaches are too great to make this system mandatory, a system which
holds so much personal information. 24 1 Similarly, in another E-Verify
Letter to Congress, many prominent groups state that they believe that
E-Verify poses a threat to both the Constitution and law-abiding
citizens.242 The groups signing onto this letter cited specific reasons
why Congress should vote against the Act, such as that it creates a de
facto national I.D. system, violates individual civil liberties such as the
right to work and free speech, mandates a costly job-killing regulatory
burden that cripples small business, requires employers to become
enforcement agents of the federal government and encourages identity
theft. 243
These reactions stem from the projected ramifications of making E-

235.
236.
237.
238.

LEGAL WORKFORCE ACT: HARMFUL AND DANGEROUS, supranote 216, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.at3.

239. See Hearing on H.R. 2164, statement of Tyler Moran, supra note 4, at 83-94.
240. See id. at 83-84.
241. See Coalition Letter to Congress re: E-Verify, THE MULTIRACIAL ACTIVIST (June 29,
2011),http://multiracial.com/site/index2.php?option=com content&dojpdf=1&id=1668.
242. See E-Verify Letter to Congress, TAKE BACK WASHINGTON 1 (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.takebackwashington.org/Clint-sOpenLetterhtml.html.
243. Id.
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Verify mandatory as seen already in states that have passed similar laws
to that being proposed by Representative Smith.
C Congress Should Heed the Lessons Learnedfrom Mandatory Use of
E- Verify.
The concerns that follow E-Verify are at the forefront regarding the
projected ramifications for the Legal Workforce Act. On January 1,
2008, Arizona's Legal Arizona Workforce Act went into effect, which
made E-Verify mandatory for all businesses in the state of Arizona.244
"While the purpose of the law was to 'turn off the job magnet,' it has
simply resulted in the growth of Arizona's cash economy, U.S. workers
losing their jobs, and burdens on small businesses."245 NILC contends
that Arizona's E-Verify law has resulted in the growth of the state's cash
economy, that it has not stopped unauthorized work and has hurt both
American workers and small businesses.2 46 The NILC urges federal
policymakers to "take heed of the outcome of Arizona's law," declaring
that undocumented workers are not going to leave the U.S. because
Congress makes it harder for them to work here.247
1. Impact on American Workers and Other Authorized Workers
Mandating E-Verify will have a negative impact on American
workers. Concerns most frequently identified by the USCIS in Arizona
include the problem that notices of database error are issued on workauthorized individuals.248 For example, a U.S. citizen construction
worker has been fired twice because E-Verify failed to confirm his
employment.249 Additionally, a father tried to hire one of his daughters,
a U.S. citizen, at his restaurant and she also received a FNC.250 On a
national scale, an estimated 770,000 American workers will lose their
jobs because of mistakes in the E-Verify system. 251 Another estimated

244. NAT'L IMMIGRATION L.
WITH
MANDATORY
EXPERIENCE

CTR., COSTLY AND INEFFECTIVE: WHAT ARIZONA'S
1 (2011), available at
E-VERIFY TEACHES US

www.nilc.org/document.html?id=328.
245. Id
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id
248. Id at 2.
249. Id
250. Id
251. Wolgin, supra note 189 at 6. See also Conklin, supra note 202 (noting that a mandatory
E-Verify system would cause about 800,000 American workers to erroneously lose their jobs, and
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1.2 to 3.5 million Americans will be required to go to the SSA to fix
erroneous information at a personal cost and lose time at work. 25 2 This
will happen in spite of the fact that the SSA is already overburdened.2 53
These errors will cause workers to lose their jobs because, as mentioned
above, the bill requires employers to re-verify the employment eligibility
of most of the current workforce.254 NILC estimates that over 47% of
U.S. citizens and authorized workers who have database errors would be
unable to correct their records and would therefore lose their jobs under
the proposed law. 255 NILC also emphasizes that "at a time of 9 percent
unemployment, putting millions of workers' jobs on the line is grossly
irresponsible."2 56 The remedy for legal residents who receive FNCs is
currently an unanswered question.257
For undocumented workers, the threat is that they may be driven
further underground, which may make the conditions they work in even
worse. Tyler Moran expressed her concern in her statement to the
Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement stating that the
undocumented workers who turn to the underground economy in
Arizona make less money and face more victimization.258 Moran
explains that this "continues to make it harder for Arizona's good
employers to compete against low-road employers."2 59
A major concern for employers is the new legislation's increased
sanctions if they were to hire an undocumented person unknowingly. 2 60
For example, Swift & Co., an E-Verify participant since 1997, was
subject to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raid where
1,282 legal and illegal immigrants were arrested. 26 1 The raid cost the
company $50 million.262 As employers receive little or no training in
how to identify legitimate documents, and are not exculpated from
running documents through the E-Verify system, the risk of sanctions
causes a "serious pattern of discrimination." 263
approximately 3.6 million others to have to spend time correcting such errors).
252. See Wolgin, supra note 189, at 5.
253. See Barrowclough, supra note 40, at 809.
254. See Hearing on H.R. 2164, statement of Tyler Moran, supra note 4, at 88 (stating that
there are currently 15,287,000 workers in the labor force).
255. LEGAL WORKFORCE ACT: HARMFUL AND DANGEROUS, supra note 216, at 2.
256. Id.
257. See Patel, supra note 137, at 464.
258. Hearingon HR. 2164, statement of Tyler Moran, supra note 4, at 84.
259. Id.
260. See Patel, supra note 137, at 465-66.
261. Id. at 465.
262. Id.
263. Pottle, supranote 25, at 137-38.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 12
576

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:547

For this reason, employees and advocates fear that the Legal
Workforce Act will encourage prejudice against legal individuals
authorized to work, such as Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) or
foreign-born citizens who look foreign and are therefore not hired
because employers do not want to take the risk by hiring someone who
might be undocumented. 2 64 "A DHS-funded study has concluded, the
current E-Verify system already contributes to discrimination among
foreign-born workers, since they are more likely to be the subject of
database errors."26 Additionally, Smith's bill allows employers to
prescreen workers, which will potentially increase discrimination. 2 66 "EVerify error rates are 30 times higher for naturalized U.S. citizens and 50
times higher for lawfully present non-immigrants than for native-born
U.S. citizens," so if these individuals are prescreened, they will appear
undocumented and therefore not authorized to work. 267 Examples of this
type of activity by an employer are the acts of Kinro Manufacturing Inc.,
where there were allegations that the company engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination against work-authorized non-citizens in the
employment eligibility verification process.2 68 The only remedy
currently available to employees who suffer discrimination is "to sue the
government for lost wages under the restrictive Federal Tort Claims
Act." 269
2. Impact on the American Economy
In addition to the negative impact on the American workforce, the
Legal Workforce Act could be particularly bad for small businesses as
they would suffer financially and could even be put out of business
because of the extensive cost involved with implementation. 27 0 Start up
costs range from $1,254 to $24,422 per small business.27 1 Start up costs
include "procuring and maintaining a computer, financing internet
access, and allocating time and labor for data entry and potential

264. See LEGAL WORKFORCE ACT: HARMFUL AND DANGEROUS, supra note 216, at 4
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Justice, Justice Department Settles Allegations of ImmigrationRelated Employment Discrimination Against Kinro Manufacturing Inc. (Aug. 26, 2011), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 1/August/I -ag- 1098.html.
269. Lamar Smith Bill, supra note 232.
270. See Conklin, supra note 202.
271. See Wolgin, supra note 189, at 4.
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correspondence with the SSA and DHS."272 The estimated start up costs
of compliance would total $188 million in fiscal year 2009 alone. 27 3 "EVerify requires high-speed internet access. A lot of rural communities,
where small businesses are the backbone of the local economy, don't
have it. What are they to do?" 274
Lastly, putting immigrants out of work will disrupt the economy.2 75
"[Undocumented workers] and their employers will simply move into
the cash economy, taking a greater share of their earnings off the tax
rolls and destabiliz[e] the playing field even more for lawful workers
and honest employers."2 76 According to the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO), the projected lost tax revenue totals $17.3 billion over the
course of ten years when undocumented workers move off the books
into underground economies where the government cannot collect
taxes. 277
The largest hit to the economy will be to the agricultural industry.
American agriculture is dependent upon the undocumented workforce
for both their cheap labor and hard work. Harsh anti-immigrant
immigration laws in various states, similar but not identical to mandating
E-Verify, have caused immigrant workers to relocate and has made it
abundantly clear just how dependent we are on them. And even though
there is particularly high unemployment, Americans are unwilling to do
the back-breaking labor required. In Georgia negative effects of
mandatory use as imposed by the state can already be seen.278 House
Bill 87, Georgia's extremely harsh anti-immigrant immigration law, has
"scared away migrant workers" and caused huge labor shortages on
farms in Georgia. 279 Governor Nathan Deal announced that Georgia
wants to try and recruit probationers to do the work in the fields, arguing
that it would be "a great partial solution."280 However, probationers
272.
273.
274.
275.

Barrowclough, supranote 40, at 809.
Patel, supranote 137, at 464.
Conklin, supra note 202.
Patel, supranote 137, at 467.

276.

LEGAL WORKFORCE ACT: HARMFUL AND DANGEROUS, supra note 216, at 1.

277. Wolgin, supra note 189, at 2.
278. See Jeremy Redmon & Daniel Malloy, Report: FarmLabor Shortage May Cost Georgia
Economy $391 Million, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Oct. 4, 2011, 11:04 PM),
http://www.aje.com/news/news/local-govt-politics/report-farm-labor-shortages-may-cost-georgiaecono/nQMPT/.
279. Id.
280. Georgia Scours Probation Rolls For Farm Labor; D.C. Begins To Look At Federal
Solutions,
PEACH
PUNDIT
(June
15,
2011,
5:00
PM),
http://www.peachpundit.com/2011/06/15/georgia-scours-probation-rolls-for-farm-labor-d-c-beginsto-look-at-federal-solutions/.
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were unwilling to do the work required.28' Since the probation farmwork program did not work, Georgia is now proposing to use prison
labor to fill the labor shortage.2 82 These farm labor shortages may cost
Georgia's economy $391 million in total,283 including $74.9 million in
crop losses, as reported by the Georgia Fruit and Vegetable Growers
284
Charles Hall, Executive Director of the Georgia Fruit
Association.
and Vegetable Growers Association has said that, "Georgia is the poster
child for what can happen when mandatory E-Verify and enforcement
legislation is passed without an adequate guest-worker program."2 85
In the wake of all that has happened in Georgia, Alabama still
passed its own brand of harsh immigration law. Alabama's "harshest-inthe-nation" immigration law has caused the exodus of the state's
undocumented workers and legal immigrants who do not want to face
harassment. 8 6 Similar to what happened in Georgia, this has created a
287
To deal with this shortage, Jerry Spencer,
major labor shortage.
Founder of Grow Alabama, which delivers locally grown produce in the
state, attempted to recruit unemployed U.S. citizens to do the work by
giving them free transportation and paying them to pick the fruit and
clean the fields.288 After two weeks, Spencer says that the experiment is
a failure; out of fifty people recruited to work, only a few lasted more
than two or three days. 289 Additionally, there is a huge difference in
productivity between migrant fieldworkers and U.S. citizen workers.290
The Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries advanced a plan
to replace immigrant workers with prisoners because of the huge labor

281. See Ray Henry, Georgia Introduces ProbationFarm-Work Program,USA TODAY (June
25, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2011-06-25-probationfarm-work-program n.htm#.
282. See Jeremy Redmon, Georgia May Use Prisoners to Fill Farm Labor Gap, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:12 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local-govtpolitics/georgia-may-use-prisoners-to-fill-farm-labor-gap/nQMRm/.
283. Redmon & Malloy, supra note 278.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Marie Diamond, Alabama Agriculture DepartmentAdvances Plan to Replace Immigrant
Workers
With
Prisoners, THINKPROGRESS
(Dec.
6,
2011,
5:10
PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/12/06/382852/alabama-agriculture-department-promotingplan-to-replace-immigrants-with-prisoners-to-farmers/.
287. Id.
288. Jay Reeves, Efforts to Replace Immigrant Workers in Alabama Fields Coming Up Short,
AL.cOM
(Oct.
17,
2011,
6:14
PM),
http://blog.al.com/wire/201 1/10/statejprogramtoreplace-immig.html.
289. Id.
290. See Id.
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shortage.29 ' Many feel that Alabama should have learned from Georgia.
Bryan Tolar, President of the Georgia Agribusiness Council, expressed
his disbelief at the actions of Alabama: "It was like, 'Good Lord,
you
292
people can't be helped. Have you all not been paying attention?"'
Why is there such a large labor shortage when the national
unemployment rate is 9%? Many feel that Americans do not want to do
the labor intensive work required by agriculture.293 Colorado corn
farmer, John Harold, wanted to help local workers find work.294
However, he has found that people just are not coming. 295 "You have to
understand there is a work ethic of migrant laborers that is just not found
with local labor," Harold said.296 Kent Scott, a blueberry farmer in
Alabama, says that Alabamians do not have the motivation to work.297
"Immigrants are willing to work. They are trying to feed their families.
They are hustling." 2 98 However, others feel it is the lack of benefits and
decent wages in the industry that deter Americans (Alabamians) from
working in the fields. 29 9 Americans work other hard jobs, such as
foundries and steel mills. 30 0 However, these jobs offer better wages and
benefits. 30 ' Americans expect more than agriculture has to offer (i.e.
wages and conditions). Farmers say they pay the wages they do to
remain competitive. Doug Massey who studies population migration
believes that there is a stigma attached; agriculture is an immigrant job
category. 302 Massey asserts that this happens in other parts of the world
as well.303 For example, Europeans will not work jobs that Americans
do because they are considered "immigrant jobs." 304 "Immigrants aren't

291. See Diamond,supra note 286.
292. Id.
293. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Why Americans Won't Do Dirty Jobs, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/why-americans-wont-dodirty-jobs-l 1092011 .html.
294. Ryan Grenoble, Colorado Corn FarmerCan't Find US. Citizens to Replace Immigrant
Labor
(VIDEO),
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
2,
2011,
5:08
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/02/colorado-farmer-cant-find-workers_n_947093.html.
295. See id.
296. Id
297. Amanda Peterson Beadle, Alabama Official Suggests Using Prisonersas Farm Workers
After Immigration Law Scares Away Laborers, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 7, 2011, 3:40 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2011/10/07/338922/alabama-prisoners-immigrants-farm-labor/.
298. Id
299. See Dwoskin, supra note 293.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. Id.
303. Id
304. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

33

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 12
580

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 30:547

stealing anything from anyone . . .. Businesses turned to foreign labor
only because they couldn't find enough Americans to take the work they
were offering." 305 Immigrant workers and native-born workers are
imperfect substitutes for one another because of educational
differences. 306 Regardless of the reason, the bottom line is that
Americans are not taking the thousands of jobs available that are
available in the fields.
D. Will the Legal Workforce Act have the desiredeffect?

As far as immigration reform goes, it is likely that the Legal
Workforce Act will not have its desired effect of lowering the presence
of undocumented workers within the United States. In addition, it is
likely to create animosity towards immigrants. As the mandatory use of
E-Verify becomes commonplace, local people will start to view
immigrants as enemies. 307 It also promotes exceptionalism. 308 Rhode
Island Governor Lincoln Chafee repealed an executive order requiring
some Rhode Island employers to use E-Verify because "it has ostracized
Latino communities" and "has caused needless anxiety within Latino
communities.
However, Barrowclough states that the shift towards "interior"
enforcement (focus of both IRCA and Legal Workforce Act) as opposed
to the previous focus of "border" enforcement has been successful in its
immigration goals and has us moving in the right direction.310 She
points to the fact that from 2005 to 2008 the number of legal immigrants
surpassed the number of illegal immigrants entering the United States."
Although, there are semi-positive results within the scope of
immigration, as discussed above, the ramifications for the U.S.
economy, American workers and undocumented workers in the way of
human rights does not justify it. Immigration and unauthorized work is
a major issue for the American community. As expressed by many
speaking on the potentially damaging effect of the Legal Workforce Act
if it is passed into law, we need to approach the problem in a different

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
See Hearingon H.R. 2164, statement of Tyler Moran, supra note 4, at 85.
See Patel, supranote 137, at 455.
See id. at 455, 474.

NAT'L IMMIGRATION L. CTR., QUOTATIONS FROM LAWMAKERS: STATE POLICYMAKERS
309.
CRITIQUE E-VERIFY 2, http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=326 (last updated July 2011).
310. See Barrowclough, supranote 40, at 797.
311. Id. at 797-98.
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way.
Various suggestions will be discussed below in the
recommendations section.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Long-Term Work Visa Program

The Legal Workforce Act operates under the idea of attrition
through enforcement. In other words, increased enforcement of tough
immigration laws will encourage undocumented persons to self-deport.
Proponents of the Legal Workforce Act and similar legislation assert that
"the ratcheting up of enforcement produces a dramatic decline in
lawbreaking," 312 further explaining that the only thing needed for
attrition through enforcement to work is the "realistic probability that
enforcement will occur."313 However, this is the exact premise that the
IRCA operates under and it is clear how ineffective it has been.314
Attrition through enforcement is not the only middle ground lying
between deporting all persons here unlawfully and granting amnesty to
everyone. 3 15 There are other possibilities that lie between these two
extremes of total enforcement or no rule of law at all. The proposed
long-term work visa program does just that.
The following proposal is somewhat radical. It involves something
approaching open borders; a long term visa program that allows visa
holders to work. The individuals are here and will come regardless. The
current legislation (IRCA) has failed to stop illegal immigration or even
to slow it down. From 1995 through 2004, nine years after IRCA's
enactment, the number of illegal immigrants has surpassed the number
of legal immigrants.3 16 Documenting the individuals who are in the
United States currently and creating a system to document individuals
who will come in the future, will accomplish immigration goals of
national security and protect American workers.
Protecting American workers means protecting jobs and protecting
wages and working conditions. However, as stated above, individuals
312. Kris W. Kobach, Attrition through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP & INT'L L. 155, 156 (2008).
313. Id. at 162.
314. As Tyler Moran expresses, "[w]e have been trying an 'immigration enforcement-onlyapproach' for at least two decades now, and it has not worked." Hearingfor H.R. 2164, statement
of Tyler Moran, supra note 4, at 94.
315. See Kobach, supra note 312, at 155-56.
316. See Jeffrey S. Passel, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND
CHARACTERISTICS 6 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.
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who have surreptitiously entered the United States are here and working,
meaning they have jobs that could be taken by an LPR or USC and are
most likely being paid much less and are made to endure much worse
conditions.317 In industries with high proportions of undocumented
workers, these lowered wages and working conditions can spread
throughout the industry and effect individuals authorized to work in the
United States. If we provide a way for persons to live and work here
legally, everyone can then exist under the rule of law. This will
eliminate the conflict of who to afford rights to among lawmakers and
will comfort them when extending rights to foreign workers in addition
to eliminating the threat of reprisals to the individuals themselves.
Therefore, there is a hope that unscrupulous employers, who are paying
below minimum wage, not paying wages at all or forcing workers to
work in unsafe conditions, will be more readily turned in.
1. Description of the Long-Term Visa Program
This proposed visa would create a new nonimmigrant category.
With it, visa holders can apply for any type of nonprofessional work.
Once here, if a worker wants to change jobs to a professional position,
such as those that require labor certification, he or she can change their
nonimmigrant visa category.3 '9 The visa would be for a specified period
of time, either nine or ten years. A labor certification would be required;
however it would not be as formal as the labor certification required for
immigrant visaS320 or even for the other nonimmigrant visas.321 The
documentation required that would be used for support would be that an
employer attempted to recruit LPRs or USCs and was unsuccessful.
Similar to the 1-9 form, the employer would compile this documentation
and keep it on file in the event of an investigation. It will work in this
317. See supra Part II.A.2.
318. The new visa category would be proposed to be a new H category as H visas already
pertain to employment.
319. This restriction would be in place because immigrants seeking out skilled jobs already
have a non-immigrant category. Additionally, unskilled labor is usually more conducive to
temporary working situations, like seasonal employment or industries with high turnovers, where
positions are not extraordinarily long term.
320. Department of Labor must certify that there are no sufficient workers in the U.S. who are
able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application and admission and that employment
will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. 8 U.S.C. §
I 182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2006).
321. Labor condition application set forth for HI-B visa holders in 8 U.S.C. § I l82(n)(1)(A)(C) and H2-A agricultural workers, both of which require a formal application and DOL
certification process.
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more self-regulated manner because some certification is necessary to
protect the American workforce and to allow native workers and
permanent residents preference over foreign workers. Allowing for this
type of preference can be managed by putting an "apply after" date on
advertisements for employment, by specifying a specific date that
persons holding this visa can apply after.3 2 2 This will help to ensure
there will not be discrimination. For instance, the employer will not
have to worry about whether an applicant is a visa holder or not and
therefore turn away persons who may be visa holders, such as
individuals who look foreign.323 Employers can work under the
assumption that prior to the date, those applying will be LPRs or USCs.
The proposed self-regulation labor certification differs from that
required for the H-2A deliberately. To get workers in under the H-2A
visa, employers have to file and apply for the workers they need after
providing evidence that they were unable to recruit American workers
for these positions.324 This process, meant to protect U.S. workers, is
extremely cumbersome and often leads to employers hiring
undocumented individuals.3 25 A study done by the Department of Labor
(DOL) concluded that "the H2-A program's hiring process was
ineffective, and characterized as having extensive administrative
requirements that often seemed counterproductive to the Department of
Labor's mandate to protect American worker's jobs."326 It is difficult to
determine if the proposed visa program can co-exist with the current H2A program (specifically supplying workers for agriculture) or if it would
supplant it all together.327
The long-term visa program would in no way change any of the
current paths to legal permanent residence or citizenship.328
Additionally, this proposal is not a "legalization" proposal because it
does not afford workers entering under the visa the rights and duties
322. A tentative suggestion would be two weeks after the posting date.
323. There is a fear of liability for hiring visa holders during the initial two weeks of
recruitment and, thus, there is a concern that employers will engage in the same discrimination that
is occurring under E-Verify and the IRCA.
324. See U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2006). See also Oliveira,supra note 30, at 164.
325. See Oliveira, supranote 30, at 172.
326. Id.
327. Replacing the H2-A program with the proposed long-term visa program would not
further any labor and employment goals, such as protecting U.S. workers; however, it would afford
the workers themselves a way to get documentation with the hope of encouraging more reporting of
workplace violations and discouraging employer exploitation of these workers.
328. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)-(c) (2006) (proscribing requirements for allocations of immigrant
visas, including family sponsored immigration, employment-based immigration, and diversity
immigration).
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associated with legal permanent residence. Rather, it will function
similarly to all other nonimmigrant categories with regards to all legal
matters such as unlawful presence, criminal violations, and civil
violations. Conceptually, it is difficult to place this type of visa in a
nonimmigrant category because of the intent requirements for nonimmigrants. However, as described above, one of the main goals of this
visa program should be to help restart circular migration; where workers
in seasonal or temporary positions go back to their home countries
during the off season.3 29 Therefore, it would be in contradiction with
this stated goal to work under the assumption that all persons already
present in the U.S. have the intent to remain here permanently.
This program can be implemented by starting with the persons
already here. The DOL and DHS can begin outreach to industries with
the highest concentrations of undocumented workers. The top industries
are agriculture, building, cleaning and maintenance, construction, food
preparation and serving, production, installation and repair, and
transportation and material moving. 3 30 By reaching out to these
industries, the dissemination of information will be quick, efficient and
cost effective. Concurrently, the DOL and DHS can put this new visa
category in literature and online information can be made available to
persons both inside and outside of the United States. The only active
"recruitment" would be of persons already within the country, in order to
give them documentation and work authorization.
Lastly, persons applying upon first entering the United States under
this visa category would have a certain amount of time to find
employment before automatically falling out of status. Similarly, if a
visa holder becomes unemployed while remaining in the U.S. for a
specified period of time, they too would fall out of status. This
provision would hope to avoid individuals becoming a public charge and
to prevent individuals who have no intention of working while in the
United States from using this visa category as a path into the country.
2. Requirements for Applicants of the Long-Term Visa
The main requirement to fit into this non-immigrant visa category
will be to produce a resume or similar documentation with the
application to demonstrate that the applicant has either previously been

329. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that temporary (or seasonal) workers
are ideal for agricultural industries).
330. Passel, supra note 316, at 27.
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employed or has a basic education level that would make him or her
employable. Additionally, applicants would need to pass a basic
physical showing that in addition to having a marketable skill, they are
also physically capable of doing the work.
Further, similar to
applications under every other non-immigrant category, applicants must
show that they are not inadmissible, and do not intend to immigrate,
which can be demonstrated by an individual having "residence in a
foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning., 33 1 Also
similar to other entries of non-immigrants is the concern of intent to
remain permanently. A pre-conceived intent to remain in the United
States violates the INA, which states that upon entering as a nonimmigrant, an individual may have no intent to abandon his or her
country of origin.332 However, the presence of dual intent, when a nonimmigrant hopes to become an immigrant, is common. In such cases
there is no violation of the statute.
The application process would mirror that of the 1-765 form, which
is the application for an 1-766 Employment Authorization Document
(EAD).333 The EAD is currently one of the documents accepted to prove
work authorization on the I-9.334 The proposed new nonimmigrant visa
category cannot fit into the existing structure of the 1-765 and 1-766
because the latter specifically states "Not Valid for Reentry," which
contradicts the basic premise of this proposal to re-encourage circular
migration. For persons already in the United States who qualify for this
visa, there will be a certain date that they must be present before and
there will be a deadline for submitting an application.335 In this way it
will be an amnesty of sorts, and individuals who fall within this bracket
can apply to the DHS without fear of reprisal, such as deportation.3 36

331.
332.
333.
BOTH

8 U.S.C.
Id.

§ 1101(a)(15)(B)

(2006).

See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., LIST A: DOCUMENTS THAT ESTABLISH
IDENTITY
AND
EMPLOYMENT
AUTHORIZATION
[hereinafter
LIST
A],

http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebld4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dla/?vgnextoid=
30341921c6898210VgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=3034192lc689821OVgnVC
M100000082ca6OaRCRD (last updated May 13, 2011).
334. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(b)(1)(B)-(D) (2006); See also Pottle, supra note 25, at 114; LIST
A, supra note 333.
335. This provision would be put in place to show that people are not entering surreptitiously
and then applying.
336. A provision such as this does not quell the concern of reprisal against individuals who
have committed identity fraud. Identity fraud is a charge brought against an individual by another
individual, therefore the proposed legislation cannot waive this individual right. Therefore, if
undocumented persons have committed identity fraud and are subsequently discovered, they run the
risk of facing charges.
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However, if an individual does not fall within these brackets and either
enters without authorization after the cutoff date or fails to register prior
to the deadline, he or she would then be considered unlawfully
present.337
B. AddressingPossible Concerns RegardingImplementation of a LongTerm Visa Program
1. Concerns of Unions and Organized Labor
Unions have historically had a restrictive stance on immigration,
as foreign labor can easily be seen as a threat to the domestic labor force.
Although organized labor is starting to recognize the need to organize
immigrants (both undocumented and documented) because they are a
major part of the workforce,3 39 a proposal for open borders may still
raise some concerns. However, one of the main purposes of this new
category of visa is to all protect workers in order to stabilize wages and
working conditions.
When employees are not protected by the
mechanisms in place for protection, employers have incentives to exploit
their workers in a variety of ways, such as underpaying them,
discriminating against them, allowing poor work conditions, and more.
This exploitation "results in further downward pressure on wages and
working conditions of all U.S. workers."3 4 0 It is the law that should set
the standards for employee wages and work conditions, not
unscrupulous employers. The idea of not investing in a worker is a
direct assault on basic employee benefits and rights.34 1
Conversely, the idea of "unlawful presence" creates a unique
juxtaposition regarding affording persons here unlawfully and working
without authorization the same rights afforded to those lawfully here.
Creating a legal document that permits individuals to both be present in
the United States and make a living here removes this juxtaposition and
supports affording all persons protection under the law. Therefore, the
focus on enforcement should be towards general enforcement of both
federal and state labor and employment laws in regard to fair wages

337. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (2006).
338. Robin Jacobson & Kim Geron, Unions and the Politics of Immigration, SOCIALISM &
ONLINE (Mar. 7, 2011), http://sdonline.org/48/unions-and-the-politics-ofDEMOCRACY
immigration/.

339.

Id

340.
341.

Hearingon H.R. 2164, statement of Tyler Moran, supra note 4, at 94.
Haines, supra note 17, at 355.
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under FLSA,342 fair and safe conditions under OSHA,343 the right to
protected concerted activity under NLRA,3 " and the right to not be
discriminated against under Title VII.345 Increased enforcement helps
protects all workers' rights.
Lastly, the provisions in place regarding job postings guaranty that
U.S. workers, both LPRs and USCs, get the first opportunity to apply for
available positions. This gives LPRs and USCs a distinct advantage and
ensures that visa holders will not be "taking" jobs before domestic
workers have had the chance to apply.
2. Another Possible Concern: Danger of Creating a Subclass
Another concern that surrounds a visa allowing persons to work is
the danger of creating a permanent subclass within society to be
exploited and "trapped" in their situation. This concern mainly stems
from the results of the bracero program and other guest worker
programs. 34 6 However, the long-term visa proposed, differs from the
bracero program in key ways. The nature of the bracero program itself
set up participants to be exploited and created a subclass of individuals
who could not escape their situation. 3 47 This was because they had a
contract drawn up by their independent governments and had no legal
recourse when employers did not abide by the terms of the contract.3 48
Similarly, guest worker programs have the same threat as the
former bracero program in that the worker is tied to his employer. 349
The employer who sponsored him or her and the provisions of the visa
do not allow for mobility of positions; once an individual is working in
the United States, that individual is stuck with the employer contracted
with under the visa.35 o The long-term visa proposed is deliberately
different from the H-2A and other guest worker programs to avoid this
342. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
343. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006).
344. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (2006).
345. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
346. See suprapp. 4-5.
347. See Francis Gabor & John B. Rosenquest IV, The Unsettled Status ofEconomic Refugees
farom the American and International Legal Perspectives-A Proposalfor Recognition Under
Existing InternationalLaw, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 275, 289 (2006).
348. See id
349. See Oliveira, supra note 30, at 169. "[T]emporary foreign workers are unable to switch
jobs and are bound to the contractors who hired them." Id Because of this "temporary workers are
exploited more than those who come illegally because [they] are bound by the H-2A visa program."
Id.
350. Id
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possibility of exploitation and creation of a subclass or underclass
unprotected by the law.
The structure of the visa program itself is designed to avoid this
very real danger. It is based on allowing visa holders to do any
unprofessional work. Applying for the visa through USCIS, like any
other visa, means that visa holders are not sponsored by a particular
employer and therefore have the same mobility as LPRs and USCs to
change positions if an employer ignores labor and employment laws.
Further, visa holders will be documented and therefore protected by
labor and employment law to the same extent as LPRs and USCs.
Lastly, with no hurdle to change non-immigrant visa categories or
change statuses, visa holders can network and get other jobs if they
present themselves, even ones that require labor certification.
It is the goal that these safeguards within the structure of the
program itself will help to avoid the possibility of visa holders being
exploited and trapped in jobs so that an employer will not take
advantage. Having a legal status to work will likely encourage abused
workers to stand up for themselves because there is no threat of
immigration based reprisals.
C. Benefits of a Long-Term Visa Program
This proposal will help to eventually end surreptitious entrance into
the country because there would be no reason to come without
documentation.
It relieves the problems that arise from illegal
immigration, such as national security - when the government is
unaware of who is present within our borders, and protects American
workers by taking the steps described above. This proposal goes beyond
accomplishing the goals of attrition through enforcement legislation such
as the Legal Workforce Act and dispenses with the concerns that arise
from such legislation. First, it reduces the potential for employer
discrimination that stems from fear of liability. Employers will no
longer fear the possibility of hiring someone who is undocumented or
unauthorized because everyone who can work can get documents to
work. Further, tentative non-confirmations, final non-confirmations,
loss of jobs (due to both TNCs and FNCs) and overburdening the SSA
because of these incorrect results would no longer be a problem because
they would not be part of the equation. There would be no threat to
overburden other agencies, such as the DOL, because the DOL is not
heavily involved. Certification is self-regulated and violators of the
program will be dealt with by the USCIS, the agency responsible for
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administering the INA. Similarly, the effect on the DHS will be the
same of any proposed legislation or program aimed at correcting the
current situation by trying to effect illegal immigration and protect U.S.
workers.
This proposal changes the face of our immigration structure. It is a
visa designed to take into consideration the needs of the workforce first
and foremost - domestic workers and foreign workers alike. It is
certainly a radical proposal, especially given the current unemployment
rates. However, "there is no statistically significant relationship between
unemployment and recent immigration.,,351 "[E]mpirical evidence does
not show a causal relationship between immigrant labor and negative
employment outcomes for native workers."352 More importantly,
employment rates are higher in higher immigrant areas because
immigrant spending stimulates the economy and creates jobs.353
Therefore, enacting and implementing a program like this should not be
feared because of the current economic climate, but rather embraced
because of the possibilities for a positive outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Legal Workforce Act and similar attrition through enforcement
legislation is not what is needed for immigration reform or the American
workforce.354 It threatens discrimination and loss of jobs.355 A better
solution which would eventually accomplish the same goal of decreasing
and eventually stopping illegal immigration is one that distinctively
looks at and considers all of the needs of domestic workers, foreign
workers and employers.3 s6 This can be accomplished through the long
term visa work program, giving eligible immigrants the documentation
needed to "legalize" our workforce. 5
This in turn will help to stop
exploitation of foreign workers and help to improve the working
conditions and wages for all workers.
DianaM Cannino*
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